

# Courting Corruption:

The Logic of Corruption Prosecutions in a New Democracy


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
Passau University

# Temporal variation




East Java (2001-2009)

# Spatial variation



East Java (2009)

# Research Strategy



# Research locations



# Two-part model

Part 1: Investigation Outcome

Part 2: Local Political and Central Government Support

		Central Government Position	
		Ambivalent	Supportive
Local Political Support	High	Possible	Highly Likely
	Low	Unlikely	Likely
	None	Highly Unlikely	N/A

# Part 1 – Stage game

- **Players** The Enforcer (E) and the Suspect (S)
- **Player function**  $P(\otimes) = E, S$
- **Strategic form**

		S	
		Collude	Defect
E	Collude	3, 3	0, 4
	Defect	4, 0	1, 1

# Part 1 – Enforcer-Suspect collusion

		Position of key central government institutions	
		Ambivalent	Supportive
Local political coalition pressure	High	Possible	Highly Likely
	Low	Unlikely	Likely
	None	Highly Unlikely	N/A



- $T_0$  = No local mobilisation
- $T_1$  = Low mobilisation (or...)

## Part 2 –

# Local mobilization-central support

- Local opposition
  - Central government signals, are they serious?
  - Constraints, threats of local retaliation
- Central government
  - National elections, anti-corruption credentials
  - Centre-periphery alliances, voter mobilisation

# Summary

