

Background Paper to the  
2001 Corruption Perceptions Index

Framework Document

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The Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite index. The data used this year were compiled between 1999 and 2001. Comparisons to last year's index are not feasible. This document explains which data entered into the index and how this data was standardized and aggregated. It is discussed how corruption is defined by our sources and how the perceptions gathered relate to reality.

## 1. The methodology

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) has assumed a central place in debates about corruption. It is used by economists, academics, business people and journalists. As in previous years, this framework document provides an in-depth explanation of the methodology. This document complements the press materials and another background paper explaining the precision of the CPI.

The goal of the CPI is to provide data on extensive perceptions of corruption within countries. This is a means of enhancing understanding of levels of corruption from one country to another. It does not attempt to assess the degree of corruption practiced by nationals outside their own countries. This is a separate phenomenon and a separate instrument, the Bribe Payers Index (BPI), was published in 1999 and will again be compiled in 2002.

In an area as complex and controversial as corruption, no single source or polling method has yet been developed that combines a perfect sampling frame, large enough country coverage, and a fully convincing methodology to produce comparative assessments. This is why the CPI has adopted the approach of a composite index. It consists of credible sources using different sampling frames and various methodologies and is the most statistically robust means of measuring perceptions of corruption.

### Objective versus subjective data

Unbiased, hard data is difficult to obtain and usually raises difficult questions with respect to validity. One such set of data has been assembled by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division of the United Nations Office at Vienna, [United Nations 1999]. This is a survey of national agencies in a large variety of countries called the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. The major goal of this investigation has been to collect cross-nationally comparative data on the incidence of reported

crime and the operations of criminal justice systems. The questionnaire consists of a series of questions which ask for data, primarily statistical, on the main components of the criminal justice system. The latest version of this survey relates to the years 1990 to 1994. All national data are derived from the official national criminal statistics.<sup>1</sup> However, the precise legal definition of bribery and corruption can be different in each national context, the differences drawn between bribery, embezzlement and fraud may be troublesome and the statistical methodology of counting and aggregating used in each national agency can differ considerably from that used elsewhere. Apart from this, countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong have extremely high per capita conviction rates for bribery. This lends itself to the conclusion that the data are to a large extent determined by the effectiveness and capacity of a country's judiciary in prosecuting corruption. High levels in this case indicate the success of anti-corruption initiatives rather than high levels of actual corruption. As such problems commonly arise with objective data, international surveys on perceptions serve as the most credible means of compiling a ranking of nations.

### Sources in 2001

Prior to selecting sources guidelines have been set up which organize the underlying decision making process. These include the actual criteria that a source needs to meet in order to qualify for inclusion as well as organizational guidelines on how the final decision is reached with the help of the Transparency International Steering Committee. This process aimed at making the final decision as transparent and robust as possible. As a result of this it was decided that the 2001 CPI includes data from the following sources:

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<sup>1</sup> A full description of the methodology and the complete data can be obtained via internet at: <http://www.ifs.univie.ac.at/~uncjin/wcs.html>.

- The World Economic Forum (WEF)
- The Institute for Management Development, Lausanne (IMD)
- PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)
- the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey (WBES)
- The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
- Freedom House, Nations in Transit (FH)
- the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong (PERC).

An essential condition for inclusion is that a source must provide a ranking of nations. This condition is not met if a source conducts surveys in a variety of countries but with varying methodologies. Comparison from one country to another are not feasible in this case and a ranking cannot be produced. Another condition is that sources must measure the overall level of corruption. This is violated if aspects of corruption are mixed with issues other than corruption such as political instability or nationalism or if changes are measured instead of levels of corruption.

The 2001 CPI combines assessments from the past three years to reduce abrupt variations in scoring. Such changes might be due to high-level political scandals that affect perceptions, but do not reflect actual changing levels of corruption. Some sources, such as WBES and PwC, provided only one recent survey. Others such as PERC, WEF and IMD conducted various surveys between 1999 and 2001, which are all included. In addition to its Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), the WEF also published the Africa Competitiveness Reports (ACR) in 2000, which is also included.

While this averaging is valuable for the inclusion of surveys, it is inappropriate for application to the data compiled by country experts. Such assessments as compiled by FH and EIU are conducted by a small number of country experts who regularly analyze a country's performance, counterchecking their conclusions with peer discussions. Following this systematic evaluation, they then consider a potential upgrading or downgrading. As a result, a country's score changes rather seldom and the data shows little year-to-year varia-

tion. Changing scores in this case are the result of a considered judgement by the organization in question. To then go back and average the assessments over a period of time would be inappropriate. On the other hand, in the case of elite or general public surveys an averaging over various years produces a useful smoothing effect. While some annual data may contain random errors, these do not necessarily carry over into the next year, and their impact is decreased by the averaging procedure. Overall, 14 sources could be included in the 2001 CPI, originating from 7 independent institutions. The complete list of sources is presented in the appendix.

The number of sources has decreased slightly in 2001 as compared to 2000. This came about as two sources used in 2000 were not used this year, the Political Risk Services (PRS) and the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), a survey of the general public. Alongside with surveys of businesspeople, the CPI had included such surveys of the general public in the past and observed that outcomes hardly changed with the sample being chosen. But the country coverage by ICVS had decreased continuously over time. It is currently the only international survey of the general public which produces data on levels of corruption. It was thus taken the strategic decision to streamline the methodology by leaving out surveys of the general public. The CPI thus represents only the viewpoints provided by businesspeople and country analysts.

PRS had been included in the CPI since 1996, contributing a variable which is called "corruption in government". It was observed that also other valuable corruption related indicators are produced by PRS, which we will seek to obtain in the future as a newly formed aggregate index by PRS. Unfortunately, there was not sufficient time to make this adjustment already this year. A strategic decision had to be taken whether to use the formerly used data on "corruption in government". Very good new sources had been included this year, while an improvement with regard to the data by PRS was not feasible. Owing to fact that the CPI aims at constant improvements of its methodology, it was decided not to use the

data by PRS. TI hopes to obtain and re-include the modified data by PRS next year. All in all, the number of countries in the CPI slightly increased from 90 last year to 91.

### **Year-to-year comparisons**

The CPI incorporates as many reliable and up-to-date sources as possible. One of the drawbacks to this approach is that year-to-year changes of a country's score do not only result from a changing perception of a country's performance but also from changes in sample and methodology. This is comparable to the problem of designing a price index for a basket of goods when the ingredients are changing. The price index for one period cannot be fully compared to that of the next since the basket on which it is based has changed. A similar problem arises with the CPI. Some sources are not updated and must be dropped as a result, while new, reliable sources are added. With differing respondents and slightly differing methodologies a change in a country's score cannot be attributed solely to actual changes in a country's performance.

Accordingly, TI repeatedly stresses that each year's index must be seen as the result of the sum of all reputable sources available at that time. Comparisons with the views collected in previous years can be misleading. However, to the extent that changes can be traced back to a change in the results from individual sources, trends can cautiously be identified. Noteworthy examples of a downward trend are Malawi, Bolivia, Greece and Norway. The considerable decline in their scores does not result from technical factors - actual changes in perceptions are therefore likely.

With the same caveats applied, on the basis of data from sources that have been consistently used for the index, improvements can be observed for Israel, Italy, Colombia and, as already mentioned last year with regard to improvements, Belgium and Japan.

## **2. Validity**

All sources generally apply a definition of corruption such as the misuse of public power

for private benefits, for example bribing of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement of public funds. Each of the sources also assesses the "extent" of corruption among public officials and politicians in the countries in question:

- The IMD asks respondents to assess whether "bribing and corruption prevail or do not prevail in the public sphere."
- The WEF asks in its 2001 Global Competitiveness Report "Irregular extra payments connected with import and export permits, public utilities and contracts, business licenses, tax payments or loan applications are common/not common." A slightly different question had been posed in 1999 and 2000, [World Economic Forum 2000: 247]. In the Africa Competitiveness Report it was additionally asked how "problematic the following areas are for doing business: ... corruption" and "when firms in your industry do business with the government, how much of the contract value must they offer in additional or unofficial payments to secure the contract?" For details see [Lambsdorff and Cornelius 2000].
- The PERC asks in 2001 "How do you rate corruption in terms of its quality or contribution to the overall living/working environment". A slightly different question had been asked previously, see Lambsdorff [2000].
- The EIU defines corruption as the misuse of public office for personal (or party political) financial gain and aims at measuring the pervasiveness of corruption. Corruption is one of over 60 indicators used to measure "country risk" and "forecasting."
- PwC asks for the frequency of corruption in various contexts (e.g. obtaining import/export permits or subsidies, avoiding taxes).
- FH determines the "level of corruption" without providing further defining statements.
- The WBES asks two questions with respect to corruption, one determining the

"Frequency of bribing" and another one relating to "corruption as a constraint to business".

The terms "frequency", "constraint", "contribution to working environment", "prevalence" and "commonness" are closely related. They all refer to some kind of "degree" of corruption, which is the also aim of the CPI. This common feature of the various sources is particularly important in view of the fact that corruption comes in different forms. It has been suggested in numerous publications that distinctions should be made between these forms of corruption, e.g. between nepotism and corruption in the form of monetary transfers. Yet, none of the data included in the CPI emphasize one form of corruption at the expense of other forms. The sources can be said to aim at measuring the same phenomenon.

It is important to note that largely none of the sources differentiates between administrative and political corruption, and that both types of corruption are addressed equally by the various questions posed. The IMD asks about corruption in the public sphere. This inevitably includes both corruption in administration and in politics, as they both constitute the public sphere. The WEF addresses particular areas where corruption can occur and in each of these, either politicians or administrators can be the relevant actors. Similarly, the level of corruption as assessed by the FH also includes both types of corruption. The EIU explicitly notes that its assessments include corruption among public servants and politicians alike. This largely justifies a blending of political and administrative corruption, since there is no strong evidence that countries differ in the prevalence of the one type of corruption over another. This is certainly not to say that a differentiation between these two types of corruption needs no further investigation. This line of research is particularly promising for the future.

### **Degrees of corruption**

As we have emphasized, the CPI aims to assess the "degree of corruption". But this term can suggest different interpretations, [Rose-

Ackerman 1999: 4]. In order to confirm the validity of our approach, we must first clarify whether this term is unambiguous. Imagine the simple case that 10 percent of all public servants take a bribe of \$200 each, 5 times a year in exchange for awarding a contract that results in a gain of \$500 each for corrupt private contractors. Degree could either relate to the frequency of corrupt acts, the amount of bribes paid or the overall gain that contractors achieve via corruption.

While all of these definitions appear to be valid, they need not fully correlate with each other. For example, consider that a few high-ranking public servants are taking large bribes on the one hand, as opposed to many public servants engaging in petty corruption on the other. The total sum of bribes might be about the same in both cases, but the frequency of corrupt incidents would doubtlessly be higher in the latter case. Similarly, when corrupt private competitors are in a strong bargaining position and do not allow much of their illegitimate gain to be shared with public servants, the total amount of bribes may be low while total gains from corruption are large. Clearly, absence of corruption would be similarly defined in all three cases — i.e. frequency, amount of bribes and value of rents — as being equal to or nearly zero.

Having taken this theoretical look at degrees of corruption, we can now turn to the particular definitions used by our sources. First, the questions asked by the WEF's Global Competitiveness Report, PwC and the WBES (first question) relates to the frequency of bribes paid. In contrast to this, the questions by the PERC and the WB (second question) hint at the damage to private business people caused by corruption. The implication here might be that large bribes are particularly serious, while large benefits to corrupt private businesspeople may not be. The questions asked by WEF's Africa Competitiveness Report related to frequency, size of bribes as well as the problems imposed on business. The questions posed by the IMD, FH and EIU provide no insight regarding an assessment of degree. The terms "level", "existence" and "pervasiveness" used there might refer to fre-

quency as well as the overall value of bribes involved.

From the various sources one can observe that frequency and the size of bribes paid tend to correlate highly. In addition to the two questions asked by WBES, another question related to the total value of bribes paid. Since responses were incomplete this indicator did not enter into the CPI. However, it is interesting to note its strong correlation with the frequency of corruption. In countries where corruption is frequent it also amounts to a high fraction of firms' revenues. Thus, a precise definition of the term "level of corruption", seems to be of minor importance to the outcome of a survey. Either, respondents have a very homogeneous pre-specified idea of how to define the "degree of corruption" which influences their response, irrespective of the precise wording of the questionnaire, or countries do not differ considerably with respect to the particular kinds of corruption that prevail there. In sum, the term "level of corruption" seems to equally reflect the two aspects, frequency of corruption and the total value of bribes paid.

### 3. Perceptions and reality

While the sources all aim at measuring the degree of corruption, the sample design differs considerably. The data by IMD, WBES, PwC and WEF largely sample residents (sometimes also from multinational companies). In contrast, the data by PERC, FH and EIU largely relate to expatriates. Whether this difference between samples may lead to different outcomes still requires scientific study. For the purposes of the CPI, it added to the robustness of the resulting figures, since the data correlate<sup>2</sup> well, irrespective of whether expatriates or residents had been polled. This correlation suggests that there being different samples makes no great difference to the results.

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<sup>2</sup> The data on correlations are provided in another background paper which deals with the precision of the CPI.

### Interpreting perceptions

As the data collected relates to perceptions rather than to real phenomena, it has to be considered whether such perceptions improve our understanding of what real levels of corruption may be. This is necessary for the CPI to be a fruitful contribution to political debate, investment decisions and academic research. Since actual levels of corruption cannot be determined directly, perceptions may be all we have to guide us. However, this approach is undermined to at least some extent, if the perceptions gathered are biased. Such a potential bias might originate from the particular cultural background of respondents. Depending on whether the sample consist of locals or expatriates, this suggests two potential biases to be relevant.

Imagine that being asked to assess the level of corruption, a local estimates a high level of corruption in the country of residence. Such an assessment would be a valid contribution to the CPI only if the respondent makes the assessment as a result of comparisons with the levels of corruption perceived in other countries. But this is not necessarily the viewpoint taken by the respondent. A respondent may also assign high levels by comparing corruption to other (potentially less pressing) problems facing the country, or by evaluating it according to a high ethical standard (e.g. which assumes any kind of gift-giving to a public official to be corrupt and not culturally acceptable). In the case of such an outlook, a high degree of observed corruption may reflect a high standard of ethics rather than a high degree of real misbehavior. Perceptions would be a misleading indicator for real levels of corruption. This bias can occur particularly if only locals are surveyed, each assessing only the level of perceived corruption in their own countries. If respondents are asked to assess foreign countries or to make comparisons between a variety of countries, this bias should not occur. Respondents will, in this case, compare a foreign country with their home country or with an even larger set of countries. They will be forced to apply the same definition of corruption and make use of

the same ethical standard for all countries, which produces valid comparative assessments. However, in this context a second type of bias might arise, originating from the potential dominance of a particular cultural heritage in the sample questioned or because expatriates lack a proper understanding of a country's culture. If this happens, comparative assessments might reflect disproportionately the perceptions of a particular culture. But the results would be meaningless to locals who have a different understanding and definition of corruption. While samples of expatriates are susceptible to this kind of bias, surveys which question local residents clearly avoid it.

The strength of the CPI rests with the idea that we include surveys which are not susceptible to the first type of bias. Particularly these are EIU, FH and PERC. Since the data provided by these sources refers to assessments by expatriates, they are subject to a homogeneous definition of corruption and a consistent ethical standard. The CPI also incorporates the data from the IMD, WEF, PwC and WBES. Since these refer to assessments made largely by local residents, they are less likely to represent the perception of a certain cultural heritage. The second type of bias can clearly be rejected for these sources.

Since the data from the EIU, FH and PERC correlate well with the other data, there seems to be no support for the suggestion that they might be influenced by the second type of bias. Similarly, since the data by the IMD, WEF, PwC and WBES correlate well with the other three sources, the notion that the first type of bias might be present is clearly not supported. The validity of the sources is mutually confirmed and prevalence of the potential biases mentioned before can be rejected. It seems that residents tend to have a consistent ethical standard with regard to assessments of corruption, while expatriates do not tend to impose an inappropriate ethical standard or to lack cultural insights. Our approach clearly suggests that the perceptions gathered are a helpful contribution to the understanding of real levels of corruption.

### **The role of the media**

Another potential problem with the collection of perceptions may arise from the possibility that respondents do not report their personal experiences but rely on media coverage and reports obtained from others. Certainly this influence cannot be excluded and necessarily contributes to perceptions. Yet in its extreme form such an influence may suggest that respondents rely only on hearsay. The potential problem with this influence is that the assessment of a country might then reflect the quality of the press in uncovering scandals, and particularly its freedom to do so. Countries that suppress a free press may escape a bad reputation for corruption among their population. Such an influence would certainly undermine the validity of the CPI and its usefulness as an aid to understanding real levels of corruption.

Comparing the CPI to the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) can shed light on this question. As reported in Lambsdorff [1999] the data by ICVS clearly relates to personal experience as opposed to hearsay, since it asks respondents whether they had been personally asked by a public servant to pay a bribe. But for a sample of 43 countries the data correlates well with the sources entering into the CPI. This indicates that hearsay is not a factor distorting the CPI.

### **4. The index**

With the various sources having some differences with respect to sample and date, a number of ideas have been considered for weighting the sources before aggregating them. These had been discussed at length in Lambsdorff [2000]. In the end, it remained preferable to adopt the simple approach of assigning equal weights to those sources which have been found to meet the criteria of reliability and professionalism. Other procedures may have their merits, but this simple averaging system is easiest to explain to a broad public.

## Standardizing

Since each of the sources uses its own scaling system, aggregation requires a standardization of the data before each country's mean value can be determined. For all sources not already standardized for the CPIs of previous years, the 2000 CPI was the starting point for this process. It had a mean value of 4.43 and a standard deviation of 2.63. Each of the sources naturally had different means and standard deviations. Yet standardization does not mean that each source is given the same mean and standard deviation, since each source covers a different subset of countries. Instead, the aim of the standardization process is to ensure that inclusion of a source consisting of a certain subset of countries should not change the mean and standard deviation of this subset of countries in the CPI. The reason is that the aim of each source is to assess countries relative to each other, and not relative to countries not included in the source. The aim here is that a country should not be "punished" for being compared with a subset of relatively uncorrupt countries, nor rewarded for being compared with a subset perceived to be corrupt. In order to achieve this, the mean and standard deviation of this subset of countries must take the same value as the respective subset in the 2000 CPI.

With  $S'(j,k)$  being the original value provided by source  $k$  to country  $j$ , the standardized value,  $S(j,k)$  is determined by

$$S(j, k) = [S'(j, k) - \text{Mean}(S'(k))] \frac{SD(2000 \text{ CPI})}{SD(S'(k))} + \text{Mean}(2000 \text{ CPI})$$

where the means and standard deviations (SD) for the source  $k$  and the 2000 CPI have been determined for the joint subset of countries.<sup>3</sup> For IMD and PERC, this stan-

dardization procedure did not change the values significantly, since the data was already delivered on a scale between 0 and 10. This contrasts to the values provided by WEF who report the data on a scale between 1 and 7. Likewise EIU and FH provide assessments ranging between 0 and 4 and between 1 and 6, respectively. The WBES provides two data on corruption, which were aggregated<sup>4</sup> before being standardized and included in the CPI.

## Presentation

The 2001 CPI includes all countries for which at least three sources had been available. Some critics had argued in favor of extending the index to include also countries for which less than three sources are available. In this case the CPI would include 149 countries. There are undeniable merits to this. A larger list of countries would further facilitate the usage of the CPI in academic research. There has been an immense research activity based on the CPI, but the limited number of countries was sometimes felt to present a slight disadvantage. Above that, it was observed that limiting the index to countries where sufficient information is available would exclude particularly countries perceived to be corrupt, because information on such countries tends to be scarce. It was argued that this may mislead the public.

But these arguments must be valued against the respective disadvantages of a further expansion. In public debate, measures of precision are commonly not well taken into account — irrespective of the immense effort TI has put into the presentation of the CPI in the past. The method to avoid this misperception has been to restrict the index to those countries where sufficient information is available. These are countries where the margin of error of the reported average score is rather low. In contrast, countries with less

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<sup>3</sup> In case a source assigns a higher score to more corrupt countries, the first term in brackets must be multiplied by (-1). A final standardization must be undertaken after aggregation of the data, because

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due to the aggregation the resulting mean and standard deviation can again differ from previous year's values.

<sup>4</sup> Again, aggregation requires a standardization procedure by means and standard deviation.



than three sources are measured with large imprecision. It therefore makes sense to stick to this established guideline and include only those countries for which at least three sources were available. Since those countries left out of the index are on average perceived to be rather corrupt, there emerges an inadequate comparison of a country to the rest of the world — an interpretation which TI did not invite for but which some media was engaged in. It may be worthwhile to note that all 149 countries would on average score 4.0. This figure may serve as a benchmark value. It also illustrates that countries not being included into the CPI should not interpret this as a particular type of qualification or disqualification.

Some media claim that the country scoring worst in the CPI is the most corrupt in the world. This year's index provides a powerful illustration that this interpretation is misleading. In the past, the worst position was sometimes occupied by Nigeria. But TI had warned that other countries not included in the index might score even worse. Indeed, another country enters in the index this year and obtains a worse position than Nigeria: Bangladesh. In case we had sufficient data on Bangladesh already in the past, this country might have obtained the worst position already then. Claims that Nigeria was the most corrupt country would have been wrong. But now to claim that Bangladesh is the most corrupt country in the world would be equally misleading. First, the measurement is not very precise. Data for this country was available from only three independent survey sources, and each of these yielded very different results. While the composite score is 0.4, the range of individual survey results is from -1.7 to +3.8. This is a greater range than for any other country. TI stresses, therefore, that this result needs to be viewed with caution. Second, there are many other countries in the world which are not included in the index. Some of these might score even worse than Bangladesh. Third, the results relate to perceptions, which need not be fully in line with reality.

On the web-sites [www.uni-goettingen.de/~uwvw](http://www.uni-goettingen.de/~uwvw) and [\[ency.org\]\(http://ency.org\) we provide further data for each country on standard errors, confidence ranges, levels of precision and the amount of independent institutions that contributed to an average value. The CPI continues to rank countries and assign scores with one digit, as we have done in the past. Alongside this data the standard deviation and the number of surveys used for each country is reported. In addition to this data, the main table provides the high-low range. This depicts the highest and the lowest values provided by our sources, so as to portray the whole range of assessments. However, no quick conclusions should be derived from this range to the underlying precision with which countries are measured. In order to arrive at such measures of precision, a more comprehensive background paper is provided at our website.](http://www.transpa-</a></p></div><div data-bbox=)

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## Appendix: Survey sources for the TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2001

Number	1	2	3
Source	Political & Economic Risk Consultancy		
Name	Asian Intelligence Issue		
Year	1999	2000	2001
Internet address	<a href="http://www.asiarisk.com/">http://www.asiarisk.com/</a>		
Who was surveyed?	Expatriate business executives		
Subject asked	Extent of corruption in a way that detracts from the business environment for foreign companies	How do you rate corruption in terms of its quality or contribution to the overall living/working environment?	
Number of replies	40-50 per country	1,027	ca. 1,000
Coverage	12 Asian countries	14 countries	

Number	4	5	6
Source	Institute for Management Development, IMD, Switzerland		
Name	World Competitiveness Yearbook		
Year	1999	2000	2001
Internet address	<a href="http://www.imd.ch/wcy">www.imd.ch/wcy</a>		
Who was surveyed?	Executives in top and middle management; domestic and international companies		
Subject asked	Whether bribing and corruption exist in the public sphere		
Number of replies	4,314	4,160	3,678
Coverage	47 countries		49 countries

Number	7	8
Source	World Bank	PricewaterhouseCoopers
Name	World Business Environment Survey	Opacity Index
Year	2001	2001
Internet address	<a href="http://www1.worldbank.org/beext/resources/assess-wbessurvey-alt.htm">www1.worldbank.org/beext/resources/assess-wbessurvey-alt.htm</a>	<a href="http://www.opacityindex.com/">www.opacityindex.com/</a>
Who was surveyed?	Senior managers	CFOs, equity analysts, bankers and PwC staff
Subject asked	"Frequency of bribing" and "corruption as a constraint to business"	Frequency of corruption in various contexts (e.g. obtaining import/export permits or subsidies, avoiding taxes)
Number of replies	10,090	1,357
Coverage	79 countries <sup>5</sup>	34 countries

<sup>5</sup> The survey was carried out in 81 countries, but data for two countries was insufficient.

Number	9	10	11
Source	Economist Intelligence Unit	Freedom House	World Economic Forum
Name	Country Risk Service and Country Forecast	Nations in Transit	Africa Competitiveness Report
Year	2001	2001	2000
Internet address	<a href="http://www.eiu.com">www.eiu.com</a>	<a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org">www.freedomhouse.org</a>	<a href="http://www.weforum.org">www.weforum.org</a>
Who was surveyed?	Expert staff assessment (expatriate)	Assessment by US academic experts and FH staff	Senior business leaders; domestic and international companies
Subject asked	Assessment of the pervasiveness of corruption among politicians and civil servants	Levels of corruption	How problematic is corruption? Are irregular, additional payments required? In large amounts?
Number of replies	Not applicable	Not applicable	1,800
Coverage	115 countries	27 transition economies	26 countries

Number	12	13	14
Source	World Economic Forum		
Name	Global Competitiveness Report		
Year	1999	2000	2001
Internet address	<a href="http://www.weforum.org">www.weforum.org</a>		
Who was surveyed?	Senior business leaders; domestic and international companies		
Subject asked	Irregular extra payments connected with import and export permits, public utilities and contracts, business licences, tax payments or loan applications are common/not common.		
Number of replies	3,934	4,022	ca. 4,600
Coverage	59 countries		76 countries